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Social Evolution
Gerald Gaus and John Thrasher

It is a mater of dispute how far back evolutionary explanations of social order should be
traced. Evolutionary ideas certainly appear in the work of the ancient Greek philosophers,
but it seems reasonable to identify the origins of modern evolutionary thinking in the
eighteenth century natural histories of civil society such as Rousseau’s Discourse on the
Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men (1750, Part III), Adam Ferguson’s An
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776,
Book III). In these eighteenth century works, the explanation of current social institutions
as an unplanned and generally adaptive development out of earlier and simpler
arrangements gained traction. Germany too had a tradition of Naturphilosophie employing
general evolutionary ideas, as well as Hegelian-influenced thinking on the development of
societies. In 1863, four years after Darwin’s Origins of the Species August Schleicher’s
Die Darwinscbe Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaf, drew on these traditions as well as
Darwin’s Origins of the Species to present an evolutionary account of the development of
families of languages (Taub, 1993), an endeavor that was carried on by a number of
scholars in the later part of the nineteenth century.

1. Spencer
Although Herbert Spencer is generally known as a “Social Darwinist” his early
evolutionary account predates The Origin of the Species. In an 1857 article in the
Westminster Review Spencer sketches a comprehensive account of evolution of the
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inorganic, organic, and human and social realms. “In respect to that progress which
individual organisms display in the course of their evolution” Spencer argues, the
investigations of “Wolff, Goethe, and von Baer, have established the truth that the series
of changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum into an
animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure”
(1857, ¶2). He continues:

On passing from Humanity under its individual form, to Humanity as socially
embodied, we find the general law still more variously exemplified. The change from
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is displayed in the progress of civilization as a
whole, as well as in the progress of every nation; and is still going on with increasing
rapidity. As we see in existing barbarous tribes, society in its first and lowest form is a
homogeneous aggregation of individuals having like powers and like functions: the
only marked difference of function being that which accompanies difference of sex.
Every man is warrior, hunter, fisherman, tool-maker, builder; every woman performs
the same drudgeries. Very early, however, in the course of social evolution, there arises
an incipient differentiation between the governing and the governed….no sooner does
the originally-homogeneous social mass differentiate into the governed and the
governing

parts,

than

this

last

exhibits an

incipient

differentiation

into

religious and secular—Church and State; while at the same time there begins to be
differentiated from both, that less definite species of government which rules our daily
intercourse—a species of government which, as we may see in heralds’ colleges, in
books of the peerage, in masters of ceremonies, is not without a certain embodiment
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of its own.

Each

of

these

is itself

subject

to

successive

differentiations….Simultaneously there has been going on a second differentiation of
a more familiar kind; that, namely, by which the mass of the community has been
segregated into distinct classes and orders of workers. While the governing part has
undergone the complex development above detailed, the governed part has undergone
an equally complex development, which has resulted in that minute division of labour
characterizing advanced nations (1857, ¶¶ 8-9).

This account is not selectionist, in the sense of postulating a filtering mechanism (such as
“survival of the fittest”) that eliminates, say, societies that are not heterogeneous in favor
of those that are. Instead, Spencer conceives of evolution as a law of increasing complexity
of all things based on the “all-pervading principle” that “Every active force produces more
than one change—every cause produces more than one effect” (1867, ¶22). Evolution,
then, is a process of increasing complexity over time.
In his 1860 essay on “The Social Organism” Spencer makes much of the idea that
societies, like individual organisms, “spontaneously evolved” to form complex systems of
interaction characterized by the division of labor (1860, ¶3). For Spencer, the “social
organism” is itself subject to evolutionary developments as a separate entity from its
constituent individuals, though individual and social organisms have distinct
characteristics. Some have taken Spencer’s belief in a developing social organism as
evidence that Spencer was willing to sacrifice individuals for the sake of the greater social
whole, but this is a mistake. In these initial statements of his social evolutionary views,
competition between individuals and families for survival is not the driving force of social
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evolution: it is a manifestation of the inner workings of all organisms toward more complex
internal organizations and mutual dependence between the constituent elements.
Ultimately, there is nothing very Darwinian in Spencer’s account. Instead, it is an
expression of a universal metaphysical principle characterizing all order, a general theory
of development. Moreover, the idea that societies could be understood as organisms with
their own evolutionary tendencies was widespread in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century thought, from Spencer to left-leaning reformers such as such as L.T. Hobhouse and
even to anarchists like Peter Kropotkin (Gaus, 1983, chap. 2). Evolution was in the air and
developmental thinking can be found in a variety of different fields from Hegel at the
beginning of the nineteenth century through Marx, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche in
philosophy to the British Whig historians like Trevelyan and Acton and even into the
understanding of the mind itself in the writing of Freud. It was an age obsessed with
understanding the progress of history and making sense of the historical laws of
development, even independent of the influence of Darwin. Indeed, Darwin can be seen,
as a one of the most important and successful of these evolutionary thinkers of the period
but in no sense was his approach unique.

2. Darwin
Darwin, unlike Spencer, was notoriously cautious in applying evolutionary principles to
humans, and only does so in a systematic way in The Descent of Man in 1871 and, to a
lesser extent, in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872. In both
works, he provides an evolutionary account of the development and importance of
sympathy and moral sense. In a crucial passage he seems to appeal both to direct
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reciprocity (Darwin 1871, Chapter 5) and group selection (Darwin 1871, Chapter 3) in
explaining the rise of sympathy:

[a] we are led by the hope of receiving good in return to perform acts of sympathetic
kindness to others; and there can be no doubt that the feeling of sympathy is much
strengthened by habit. In however complex a manner this feeling may have originated,
as it is one of high importance to all those animals which aid and defend each other, it
will have been increased, through natural selection; [b] for those communities, which
included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members, would flourish best
and rear the greatest number of offspring (Darwin, 1871, 82).

Darwin’s passage raises a theoretical point that should be emphasized. Note that claim
[a] is consistent with an account of natural selection that operates only at the level of
individual organism: those who help others when they can expect help in return outcompete
non-reciprocating egoists in the struggle for existence. Organism A’s act f of helping B is
to the evolutionary advantage of A if the expected benefits from future help by B exceed
the costs of f to A (Henrich and Henrich, 2007, 42; Hamilton, 1964). So on this analysis
sympathy, which can lead one to help another, does not produce (from an evolutionary
point of view) genuine altruism, since f is to A’s long-term advantage. On the other hand
at [b] Darwin appears to be positing a group selection mechanism; communities composed
of sympathetic individuals will outperform communities of egoists without sympathy. Here
we confront great controversy. Although group selectionist accounts were widely accepted
in the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, in the 1970s the idea
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was discredited and, indeed, identified as simple and manifest error. The problem is
obvious: even if a group of sympathetic individuals outperform a group of non-sympathetic
egoists, a non-sympathetic egoist within a group of sympathetic individuals will
outperform the rest of their group. The free-riding non-reciprocator receives all the benefits
of living in a sympathetic reciprocating group, but never has to bear any of the costs of
reciprocating, in the sense of sacrificing some of its own fitness to help other group
members.

If such defectors thrive in the group, they will eventually dominate it

outcompeting the reciprocators. In the last few decades, however, evolutionary theorists
have reevaluated the possibility of group selection; under certain conditions it is certainly
a theoretical, mathematical, possibility and may, indeed, be an important factor in cultural
evolution (Sober and Wilson, 1999; Okasha, 2008; Boyd and Richerson, 2005). It is
important, however, to distinguish between group selection in cultural evolution and group
selection in biological evolution. The former operates on different principles than the latter
and is considerably less controversial.

3. The Late Nineteenth Century Debate: Competitive or Cooperative Evolution?
The great debate in social and political philosophy in the late nineteenth century was not
whether Darwin’s views were applicable to the study of society, but whether the study of
social evolution appropriately stresses competition among individuals within a society, or
the cooperative nature of successful societies—ideas, as we have just seen, that can be
found side-by-side in Darwin. Although Darwin was always generally cautious in his
pronouncements, especially when they involved the application of his theory to human
society, his views tended toward the competitive side of the debate. It is important to stress
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in this regard that Darwin’s key idea of the “struggle for existence” was itself taken over
from Thomas Malthus’s 1798 essay on population, which stressed that social life is always
a struggle between increasing population and the constraints on food supply. To give food
to non-producer over a producer was to not only to increase the burdens on the food
producers in their struggle for existence, but also to handicap society in it efforts to produce
as a whole (Malthus, 1798, chap. III, ¶6; Ritchie, 1891, 2). In a letter Darwin remarks
“What a foolish idea seems to prevail in Germany on the connection between Socialism
and Evolution through Natural Selection” (F. Darwin, 1887, 237). Yet, in the end, Darwin
also provides support for a more cooperative reading as well:

Important as the struggle for existence has been and even still is, yet as far as the highest
part of man’s nature is concerned there are other agencies more important. For the
moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the
effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, &c., than through natural
selection; though to this latter agency the social instincts, which afforded the basis for
the development of the moral sense, may be safely attributed (Darwin, 1871, 404).

Besides Spencer, who certainly became associated with the competitive interpretation,
perhaps the most famous exponent of this view was William Graham Sumner. According
to Sumner, “man is born under the necessity of sustaining the existence he has received by
an onerous struggle against nature, both to win what is essential to his life, and to ward off
what is prejudicial to it” (1860, ¶2). The crux of this argument, though, is essentially
Mathusian: our struggle is against nature and only derivatively against each other, as we
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“are struggling each to win from nature the material goods necessary to support life, and
are carrying on this struggle side by side…” (Sumner, 1881, ¶11). To Sumner, socialism
simply was simply a sentimental philosophy that denied unpalatable reality. For Sumner
as for Spencer, the study of sociology was to help us cope with hard reality that nature
confronts us with. With Sumner we see an especially clear example of a fairly swift move
from an account of social evolution to social policy, which could not negate the inherent
competition among individuals.
The late nineteenth century response by those friendly to socialism was generally not
to dismiss the relevance evolutionary analysis to social and political philosophy, but to
insist on the social-cooperative interpretation. In his important Darwinism and Politics
(1891), D. G. Ritchie insisted that while an individual struggle for material existence may
characterize lower levels of evolution, in advanced civilizations social evolution is moved
by the selection of ideas as embodied in institutions that make for a cooperative order.
Socialism, according to Ritchie, was the sort of arrangement that, in contrast to the laissez
faire of Spencer and Sumner, is favored in advanced civilizations. L.T. Hobhouse, one of
the founders of the “new liberalism,” stressed the case for expanded poor relief,
unemployment insurance, and old-age pensions. He also took an explicitly cooperative
view of social evolution. Like Ritchie he insisted that the “higher” phases of social
evolution are guided by a mental evolution—the evolution of a social mind. He argued,
“the turning point in the evolution of thought … is reached when the conception of the
development of humanity enters into explicit consciousness as the directing principle of
human endeavor” (1911, 155; see also Hobhouse, 1901). Hobhouse’s conception of the
development of societies and thought towards higher stages of cooperation and more
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reflective consciousness greatly influenced his student, Morris Ginsberg, who advocated
evolutionary sociology in the first half of the twentieth century. Ginsberg believed that the
outcome of social evolution is that “men have become increasingly conscious of a
fundamental unity of purpose and a good common to all mankind” (1931, 223). Although
Ritchie sought to make the much of his account consistent with a Darwinian orientation,
this is not true of many other similar thinkers. For the most part, these cooperative accounts
are explicitly non-Darwinian; social evolution is viewed as a principle of development or
“growth” in ways that are not radically different from Spencer’s pre-Darwinian
formulation.

4. F.A. Hayek
Although Ginsberg and a few others championed social evolutionary thought through the
1930s and later, willingness to apply evolutionary analysis to societies and social policy
radically dropped off after the first world war, and even more dramatically after the rise
fascism. The idea of struggle for existence or survival of the fittest were often depicted as
imperialistic or aggressively nationalistic ideas; combined with the association of the social
application of Darwinian principles with eugenics, social evolutionary thought was
generally thought to be discredited in the early and mid-twentieth century (Hodgson and
Thorbjørn, 2010: 16). During the 1950s, when the idea of social evolution was deeply
unpopular, Hayek started to revive the approach in his University of Chicago
interdisciplinary seminar. Participants in the seminar included the geneticist Seawall
Wright, himself a group selectionist (Caldwell, 2004, 299). This was the beginning of a
number of works by Hayek in the 1960s and 1970s, wherein he developed a sophisticated
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analysis of the relation between complex phenomena, spontaneous orders, and cultural
evolution (Gaus, 2006). These accounts employed selectionist ideas but were not directly
Darwinian.
Hayek repeatedly refers to “the twin ideas of evolution and spontaneous order” (Hayek,
1967c, 77; 1978b, 250; 1973, 23; 158; 1988, 146). The starting point is Hayek’s work on
complex phenomena; in contrast to the relatively simple phenomena studied by classical
mechanics, biological organisms and social orders are complex systems that give rise to
emergent properties, which can only be predicted within very broad ranges (Hayek, 1967b).
Throughout his long career — and certainly since the 1950s — Hayek’s overriding concern
was the analysis of the emergent property he called “the order of actions”:

It is the resulting overall order of actions but not the regularity of the actions of the
separate individuals as such which is important for the preservation of the group; and
a certain kind of overall order may in the same manner contribute to the survival of the
members of the group whatever the particular rules of individual conduct that bring it
about (1967c, 68).

Hayek’s fundamental claim is that the survival of a society depends on the emergent
property of orderly cooperation of different individuals, which has a complex relation to
the rules of conduct individuals follow. Some theories of spontaneous order (e.g.
economics) explain how the complex order of social actions can be self-organizing and
self-maintaining — they are essentially what Hayek calls “models” of the complex
phenomenon of the social order of actions, providing general accounts of how the elements
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relate (Hayek, 1967a, 14ff). But to understand the workings of a complex social order of
actions—spontaneously organized and self-regulating complex phenomena— is, still,
essentially a static explanation. Hayek is so attracted to evolutionary accounts of the order
of actions because they hold out the promise of providing general explanations of the
alteration and development of complex orders without needing the assumption that anyone
fully understands the working of the order. As Hayek sees it, evolutionary accounts provide
the real alternative to design or “constructivist theories” (Hayek 1973, Chapter 1).
Evolutionary accounts articulate precisely the type of explanations based on the principles
of change, rather than the prediction of system states, that are appropriate to complex
systems (Hayek, 1967b, 31ff.). In biology, Darwinian theory allows us to understand the
principles that regulate the development of species, shows us that some developments are
outside the possible range of possible values (e.g. that horses will suddenly give birth to
winged offspring), but it is unable to generate specific predictions about the future of
individuals or species (Hayek, 1967b). Hayek believes that the same types of explanations
are appropriate in other complex systems like the economy or society as a whole.
In Hayek’s social evolutionary analysis, then, the explanandum (that which is to be
explained) is the rise and development of an emergent property, viz., the social order of
actions. As Hayek says, “the selection process will operate on the order as a whole” (1967c,
71). This is social order of actions is what Hayek calls the “Great Society”: an overall

spontaneous order of adaptations that allows for coordinated action (Hayek, 1973, 2ff.). The
explanans (that which does the explaining) is an evolutionary account whereby the rules
and institutions that give rise to this order (i.e., this emergent property) are selected via a
competition within and among social orders. The emergent property, we have seen, arises
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out of a system of rules; therefore their constituent rules and institutions determine the
competition among these social orders as they operate in specific environments.
Constituent rules and institutions differentiate social orders; variation in the rules and
institutions can provide a competitive advantage in the competition between social orders,
leading to selection of a social order of actions with certain sets of rules.
Hayek suggests a number of selection mechanisms, one of which of group survival.
He argues that:

The rules of conduct have … evolved because the groups who practiced them were
more successful and displaced others. They were rules which, given the environment
in which men lived, secured that a greater number of the groups or individuals who
practiced them would survive (Hayek, 1973, 18; see also Hayek, 1988, 25).

This passage presents difficulties. By simply talking of “groups,” and then adding at the
close that “greater number of the groups or individuals” survive, Hayek appears to be
directly falling prey to problems of group selection and collective action. It looks as if
Hayek is claiming that an individual’s chance of survival is maximized if she belongs to a
group that maximizes its own chance of survival (Hayek, 1967c, 72). But this raises
familiar problems of collective action and the rationality of free-riding that we saw in §2.
If individuals are confronting prisoner’s dilemmas, it may be rational for each person not
to do the thing that is good for the group, even though this leads to a situation that is
disadvantageous for all. One of the lessons of game theory is that what is good for the
group may not be rational for any particular person in the group.
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Hayek also, however, writes that a person’s “thinking and acting are governed by rules
which have by a process of selection been evolved in the society in which he lives” (Hayek,
1973, 11. Emphasis added). Understood thus, it looks now as if his project is to explain
how each rule (not the order of actions itself) evolved within the society. That this project
may rely not only to the rule’s ability to produce a competitive order of actions, but the
rule attractiveness to individuals who live under it, is suggested by Hayek’s remark that
“[t]he competition on which the process of selection rests must be understood in the widest
sense. It involves competition between organized and unorganized groups no less than
competition between individuals” (Hayek, 1960, 37. Emphasis added.) This stress on
individual competition and the evolution of rules suggests that, instead of a competition
between social orders, Hayek has in mind a competition between individuals within a social
order that leads to the selection and evolution of rules. So we seem to have two evolutionary
competitions, pressuring rules from two different directions. (a) A competition exists
between social orders that are, as it were, carriers of rules (as individual organisms are
carriers of genes). The rules give a social order a certain competitive advantage, but the
rules are only selected insofar as they are part of the evolved social order of actions. (b)
There is also a competition between individuals and groups within a social order, and this
competition selects certain rules as conducive to individual/group success.

5. Game Theoretic Modeling of Evolution
Although Hayek and Darwin saw quite clearly the implications of their evolutionary
approach to understanding human institutions, they lacked the analytical tools to fully
explore their central insights. Hayek’s goal, as we have seen, was to develop a dynamic
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analysis of social evolution that could replace, what he considered, outmoded forms of
social theory. Advances in the understanding of biological evolution in the mid-twentieth
century were combined with advances in mathematical techniques, most notably in game
theory and the modeling of complex, dynamic systems. The first development of the ideas
that would become evolutionary game theory were made by, quite possibly, the most
important biologist in the twentieth century, R.A. Fisher. His work on sex ratios in The
Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, a key book in the development of the modern
evolutionary synthesis of genetics with natural selection, developed the basic idea of
evolutionary equilibrium as a kind of competitive stability (1930). Competitive stability
could be modeled in game theoretic terms. This insight led to the development of
evolutionary game theory.
The irony, as John Maynard Smith points out on the opening page of his monumental
Evolution and the Theory of Games is that “…game theory is more readily applied to
biology than to the field of economic behavior for which it was originally designed” (1982,
vii). This is because the basic solution concept of traditional game theory, the Nash
Equilibrium, has some drawbacks in terms of modeling individual rational strategic
behavior. As Maynard Smith notes, there are good reasons to doubt that humans will
behave rationally in the way that traditional game theory suggests (1982, vii). Furthermore,
the unrealistic requirements of common knowledge required in traditional game theory
makes it unsuitable as the basis of an empirical, prediction based science of human
behavior (Sugden, 1991).
Game theory, when applied to a biological context, however, is a powerful tool. Instead
of looking at what is a rational strategy for an individual agent to adopt, we look at stable
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strategies across whole population. This has several implications. First, the payoffs to the
game which were, in traditional game theory, the somewhat murky notions of individual
utility, are transformed into the much more straightforward idea of replication rates.
Successful strategies propagate themselves at a higher rate than unsuccessful strategies.
This solves the perennial problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility by locating
payoffs along a single dimension of reproductive success. Second, the idea of a mixedstrategy, a key component to the power of the Nash existence theorem (which shows that
all finite games have at least one Nash equilibrium), was never well motivated in the case
of individual single play games. As many have pointed out, it is hard to see what rationally
accessible reason a person could have for actually playing mixed-strategy equilibria (Pettit
1996, 291-293). At the population level, however, this problem is solved by understanding
mixed-strategies as populations divided into different strategies.

To have 1/3 of a

population be composed of strategy A agents and 2/3 of the population be composed of
strategy B agents makes sense in a way that an individual agent playing strategy A 1/3 of
the time and strategy 2/3 of the time in a single-play game does not. Third, the fundamental
solution concept of evolutionary game theory, the “evolutionarily stable strategy” (ESS)
seems more robust than the various solution concepts in traditional game theory.
The ESS is, again, based on looking at population level dynamics. As Maynard Smith
puts it, “evolutionary game theory is a way of thinking about evolution at the phenotypic
level when fitness of particular phenotypes depend on their frequency in the population”
(1982, 1). In evolutionary game theory, phenotypes are represented as particular strategies.
Each strategy has a given payoff in terms of fitness when paired against any other strategy
in a population, including itself. A strategy is an ESS if, as Herbert Gintis puts it, “…a
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whole population using that strategy cannot be invaded by a small group with a mutant
[phenotype]” (Gintis, 2009b, 229). Similarly, a social “phenotype,” a set of social norms,
rules, or practices, will be evolutionarily stable if a group of mutant innovators cannot
move the entire population away from the equilibrium strategy.
To better see this, consider the classic Hawk-Dove game given in Figure 1:
Hawk

Dove

-5

Hawk
-5

0
10

10

Dove
0

5
5

Figure 1: A Specific Hawk-Dove Game

Suppose that Hawks and Doves are phenotypes in the population. A Hawk always battles
for territory until either it is injured or its opponent retreats. A Dove engages in display
battle: if it meets a Hawk it quickly retreats without injury; if it meets another Dove, there
is a .5 probability that it will retreat—in no case does it sustain injury. The expected payoff
of a Hawk playing another Hawk is -5; the expected payoff of a Hawk meeting a Dove is
10; the expected payoff of a Dove meeting a Hawk is 0; and the expected payoff of a Dove
meeting a Dove is 5 with payoffs representing differential reproduction of the phenotype
in the next generation. Though the players do not vary their strategies (and so they cannot
make “moves” in the sense of traditional game theory), we can understand the population
as “moving” in the sense that, if being a Hawk has a higher expected payoff than being a
Dove, the population will move towards more Hawks and fewer Doves. In evolutionary
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terms we can think of this as a replicator dynamic in which those strategies that tend to
have higher average payoffs increase in the population and so displace lower payoff
strategies (Skyrms, 1996). Neither an all-Hawk nor all-Dove is an evolutionary stable
strategy. For a population of all Hawks the average expected payoff of the population is 5; since a mutant Dove would have a payoff of 0 it would outperform the population
average and increase. For a population of all Doves, the average population payoff is 5; a
mutant Hawk would receive a payoff of 10, thus again outperforming the average of the
Dove population. An evolutionary stable equilibrium would be a mixed population evenly
split between Doves and Hawks. At that mix the average Hawk and average Dove payoffs
are the same (2½), and so neither population can grow at the expense of the other. This is
equivalent is a Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies.
The basic tools of evolutionary game theory can be extremely powerful, allowing
theorists to model the specific dynamics of different social evolutionary states in a way that
Hayek could never have imagined. Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that
evolutionary game theory is essential to a unified understanding of the social and
behavioral sciences (Gintis, 2009a). The basic hope is that, given this powerful analytical
tool, social theorists can model the complex world of social interaction and the
development of different social evolutionary equilibria. Much work has already been done
along these lines and evolutionary game theory has helped clarify important social
practices like the development of social norms (Bicchieri, 2006), property in both animal
and human populations (Gintis, 2007), and altruism (Trivers, 1971) among others.

6. The Co-evolution of Genes and Culture
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Another set of powerful formal models of cultural evolution based on population dynamics
have been developed by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (1985, 2005). Boyd and
Richerson’s approach seeks “a systematic framework” accounting “for all the processes by
which the distribution of beliefs, attitudes and values in a population are modified” (1985:
11-12). The aim is to model cultural evolution in terms of demographic dynamics,
accounting for social, ecological and psychological processes. On their analysis the forces
of cultural evolution can be divided into (a) the inertial, (b) those that induce variation, and
(c) those resulting form natural selection (Richerson and Boyd, 2005, 68). The inertial
forces are those that induce towards stability, such as the accurate copying of ideas and
models from one person to the next, which accurately replicate cultural forms. In contrast,
cultural factors that induce variation lead to cultural changes, and can be subdivided into
random and decision-making variations. Random variations include, say, simple errors in
copying cultural forms leading to mutations, as well as a cultural version of genetic drift
(if a society has some skill that is practiced by a small group and, by chance, this group
dies off in a generation, the society will loose that cultural form). Boyd and Richerson place
great stress on decision-making factors that induce variation. What they call “guided
variation” involve social learning and invention which are successfully reproduced. Some
individual, confronting a problem, may discover a superior method that is then copied by
others. On their view, however, a great amount of cultural variation stems from “biased
transmission,” where certain sorts of cultural forms are more likely to be reproduced than
others. For example, cultural ideas and practices practiced by high prestige individuals are
more likely to be copied, as are more common forms, or simply those that are simpler and
easier to remember.
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Fundamental to Boyd and Richerson’s view is the hypothesis of the co-evolution of
culture and genes (see also Henrich and Henrich, 2007, chap. 2). The variation of cultural
forms is affected by their interaction with natural selection: cultural forms that have
advantages in natural selection (say, language) can spread. According to the crucial
coevolution thesis, the relation between natural selection and cultural evolution is
reciprocal: natural selection primes us for some culture variations, which may be favored
by natural selection, yet those cultural forms change the environment in which natural
selection operates.
Boyd and Richerson’s account is straightforwardly selectionist, with selection
operating at both individual and group levels, on both cultural and biological dimensions.
Thus some cultural form (say, a new way of farming), may be selected because individuals
who employ it are seen to do better, and so are copied by others, but also because groups
that employ the method outperform groups that do not, and so eventually are copied by, or
eliminate, other groups (Boyd and Richerson, 2005, chap. 11). Furthermore, as we have
just seen, a form may spread because it is seen as useful (and so selected by at the cultural
level), but it may also spread because it gives those who use it a biological evolutionary
advantage (and so selected by natural selection).
An especially important part of the work of Boyd, Richerson, as well as Gintis, Ernst
Fehr and others has been the analysis of the evolution of cooperation in large groups (Boyd
and Richerson, 2005, Part 3; Gintis, Bowels, Boyd, and Fehr, 2005; Henrich and Henrich,
2007). In many ways the beginning of rigorous analysis of the evolution of cooperation
was Robert Axelrod’s (1984) analysis of tit-for-tat in iterated prisoner’s dilemmas. Axelrod
showed that if we model cooperation in terms of direct reciprocity (each person
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reciprocates with other individuals who have cooperated with her, but refuses cooperation
with those who have not cooperated with her), then strategies such as tit-for-tat can account
for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. From the perspective of game theory
Binmore (2005) has effectively shown that the family of possible strategies in equilibrium
is much larger than tit-for-tat and its near variants. The crucial findings of Boyd, Richerson
and others, however, is that direct reciprocity, which places heavy information demands
on those who employ it, is not a plausible model for the evolution of cooperation in large
groups (Boyd and Richerson, 2005, chaps. 8-10; Henrich and Henrich, 2007, chaps. 6-7;
Gaus, 2001, chap. 2). It seems that the most plausible hypothesis is that the evolution of
large-scale human cooperation is best explained by the evolution of “altruistic punishers”
or what might be called “rule-following punishers” — individuals who follow norms when
most others do so, and who are also willing to expend resources to punish non-cooperators.
Groups of such rule-following punishers outcompete groups composed of more egoist
individuals and also resist invasion by defectors (Gaus, 2011, chap. 3). This explanation
show, if correct, provides an answer to the problem that Darwin posed in 1871 about the
possibility of morals and cooperation evolving.
Despite the power of the co-evolutionary account of cultural evolution proposed by
Boyd and Richerson, there is some controversy over what exactly an account of cultural
evolution is about. That is, what is culture and how is it transmitted. In many ways, this
controversy is the cultural evolutionary version of the traditional “levels of selection”
debate in the philosophy of biology. This debate arises because of the abstract nature of
idea of natural selection.

This combined with the hierarchical nature of biological

organisms and the complex nature of adaptation makes it unclear what should be
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considered the replicator that is selected in certain cases (Okasha, 2001, Chap. 1). The
fuzzy nature of what constitutes culture, norms, principles, and social rules makes this
problem even more acute. In his groundbreaking 1976 defense of gene level selection, The
Selfish Gene, Dawkins first introduced the idea of the “meme” which acts as the analogue
to the gene in social evolution (1976, Chap.11). Dawkins insists that cultural evolution is
driven by gene-like memes at the genotypic level.
Dan Sperber proposes a model cultural evolution based on what he calls the
“epidemiology of representations” (Sperber 1996, 1).

Sperber’s goal is to build a

naturalistic theory of culture and its evolution through an epidemiological model that
explains “population-scale macro phenomena…as the cumulative effect of microprocesses” (Sperber 1996, 2). Sperber disagrees with Dawkins and, to a certain extent,
with Boyd and Richerson that cultural evolution can be understood along Darwinian lines.
For Sperber, culture is made up of micro-level mental representations in the mind of all of
the individuals within a social unit (Sperber 1996, 70-71). Furthermore, “the human mind
is susceptible to cultural representations in the same way as the human organism is
susceptible to disease” (Sperber 1996, 57). Some cultural representations are more
“contagious” and have more staying power than others. The debate between the Sperberian
account of cultural evolution and Boyd and Richerson has many dimensions, but the main
thread of the controversy is over the unit and process of cultural transmission. Sperber
argues that we need to understand the genotypic process of cultural evolution; in this case
the mental representations of culture, to understand how culture changes and is maintained.
Gene-culture co-evolution is “too slow a process” according to Sperber to explain cultural
changes over the last couple of thousand years (Sperber 1996, 114). Instead of co-
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evolution, we should focus on the psychological nature of the transmission and stability of
representations from one person to another. Following a theory of mental representations
heavily informed by the work of Chomsky and Fodor, Sperber builds a basically
“Lamarckian” account of social evolution from the inside out, that is, from the nature of
genotypic mental representations to culture as a whole. Boyd and Richerson, on the other
hand, have developed a “Darwinian” model of social evolution that is more interested in
explaining phenotypic selection while remaining silent on genotypic causes (Boyd and
Richerson 2005, 80-81). Far from privileging one approach over the other, it seems fruitful
to pursue both lines of research simultaneously. Either one will prove more explanatorily
productive than the other or they will converge, in either case the pursuit will have been
useful.

7. Conclusion
The study of the nature of social evolution is manifestation of the desire to understand
where we came from and where we are headed. In a more sophisticated form, it is as
version of the Hegelian dream of being able to understand the laws of historical
development. To be able to see and understand the road that led from our Neolithic past
to the present is also, to one degree or another, to have some insight into the shape of things
to come. A better understanding of the nature of social evolution is also important for
political and moral philosophers because it can help draw the limits of the feasible while
also reinforcing the contingency of our social and moral institutions. The Hayekian insight
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that the belief that we can reshape our social and moral institutions at will is nothing more
than hubris is magnified and reinforced once we start to understand the processes that have
created us and will continue to form us in the future.
We have also seen how much in this field is still unresolved. The debate over
competitive vs. cooperative evolution that was started in the nineteenth century is still
raging. Furthermore, this debate is also connected to the larger debate over the levels of
selection and the possibility of group selection in biological and cultural evolution. As we
saw in §6, there is also still a debate over the relative importance of biological and cultural
evolution proper over the development of culture. In many ways, then, the field of social
evolution is just beginning, with many different progressive research programs.
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